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SUPERFUND AND THE EVOLUTION OF BROWNFIELDS
ROBERT H. ABRAMS*
Environmental law broadly defined has emerged as the most fertile
ground for ventilating federalism issues. Whether the issue is one of resource
regulation' or pollution control, the traditional primacy of the state police
power in matters of health, safety, and welfare, counsels that the federal
environmental laws operate with sensitivity to state interests. Historically,
Congress has borne this in mind and pursued national interests in a way that
maintained a considerable role for the states. So too, United States Supreme
Court decisions in environmental law cases posing preemption of state law
claims show a significant regard for state prerogatives and a commitment to
a view of federalism that does not readily displace the states.2
In the environmental field, the most discernible form of federalism is
that established by the major federal pollution control statutes, the Clean Air
Act3 and Clean Water Act.' Dubbed "cooperative federalism," the basic
model is that of the national government setting standards of environmental
quality or levels of pollution control and a program of regulation by which
the targeted objectives are to be achieved. The national government, through
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), stands ready
to administer these laws in their entirety, but offers to the states the
opportunity to take the lead role by enacting regulatory programs that the
EPA finds capable of adequately implementing the national regulatory
scheme. With only minor exceptions, the states have accepted the offered
authority and have become the front-line administrators of programs designed
to meet the federally set standards intended to assure the nation of sufficient
levels of air and water pollution control.
* Professor Abrams is a Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School and
serves as an Adjunct Professor of Natural Resources at the University of Michigan Law
School. He received his A.B. from the University of Michigan and his J.D. from the
University of Michigan Law School.
' See generally California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990); California Coastal Comm'n v.
Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
2 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01-7671q (1994).
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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All of that said, however, there are environmental areas in which there
has been a different dynamic, not necessarily one of non-deference to the
states, but more aptly one of federal leadership. The federal government
seizes the initiative and legislates in ways that channel its own quite
considerable resources and influence toward an environmental concern,
leaving the states free to act in the same field in either parallel or serial
fashion. Parallel in this context is meant to denote state laws that mimic the
federal enactment with a state-oriented jurisdictional scope, while serial in
this context is meant to denote state laws that enter the field and add elements
to the federal scheme. The sentinel federal leadership example is the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969' ("NEPA") and its environmental impact
assessment requirement. Congress moved independent of the states, issuing
what is in essence a directive to the federal agencies channeling the vast
federal bureaucracy to act with environmental awareness. This law had
localized impacts insofar as the affected federal decisions almost invariably
caused effects within the several states. Taking the federal cue, many states
enacted parallel legislation at the state level, applying the model to their own
activities and those of their citizens.
I. SUPERFUND AND ITS PARALLEL AND SERIAL STATE EXPANSION
More central to present concerns, a "federal-first" pattern emerged in
responding to remediating the dangers posed by the release of hazardous
substances into the environment. The relevant federal statute, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA," better known as "Superfund"),6 is an example of Congress
seizing the initiative and committing federal resources to meet an
environmental problem. Quite plainly, Superfund's programmatic initiative
is more intrusive than its "feds first" cousin, NEPA. Superfund reaches
deeply into the states, affecting specific parcels of land that traditionally had
been regulated exclusively by state law. In this way, although not a total
outlier, Superfund as first conceived and enacted shared almost no
commonality with the cooperative federalism of the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act, and bore almost no resemblance to NEPA.
The choice of a non-deferential form of federalism in Superfund
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
6 Id. §§ 9601-9675.
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appears to have been deliberate. In 1980 when Congress enacted Superfund,7
whose popular title derives from the image of a vast fund from which the
EPA pays for the staggering cost of cleanups of contaminated properties
throughout the nation, Congress thought it was addressing a significantly
different phenomenon than that of ordinary pollution. Superfund vested EPA
with the primary role in obtaining cleanups of sites contaminated by the
release of hazardous substances into the environment, leaving a role for state
input within a sphere of federal control!
Explanations for the divergence from the cooperative federalism mold
can be imagined. First, there are more than superficial differences between
seeking remediation of toxic contamination of a site and the ongoing
regulation of polluting entities. The former is more of a one-time event that
is unlikely to reoccur after the cleanup and requiring no continuing oversight
after its completion. Also pointing toward a dominant federal role is the
expectation that EPA would develop expertise and carry it from site to site
in a way that the states could not replicate. The severity and frequency of the
problem also may have been a factor. Congress believed that the scope and
scale of the problems faced by Superfund did not closely resemble the
ordinary, widespread production of air and water effluents. When Superfund
was passed, Congress seemed to think that the number of sites involved
would be relatively few, but that those sites would involve serious threats to
public health. Love Canal was frequently adverted to in the legislative
debates. If there were relatively few sites involved and they were of vast
magnitude and complexity, the resources of the national government could
better address them. Toward that end, Congress established the multi-billion
dollar fund aspect of Superfund. The operative premise of the law was that
EPA would use the fund or its CERCLA-granted power to issue
administrative orders to obtain prompt and efficacious cleanups,9 thereafter
using the law's extremely broad liability section10 to recoup whatever
Superfund monies were expended in the process.
Where CERCLA pioneered, state parallel replication followed in at
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2).
9 See id. § 9606(a).
" See id. § 9607.
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least forty-five states."' These parallel laws created state cleanup regimes that
in most states parroted Superfund, e.g., strict, joint and several, and
retroactive liability, for all of those contributing to the chain of events that led
to the escape of hazardous materials into the environment. 12 In many cases,
these laws were even more aggressive than Superfund, closing loopholes in
its coverage scheme such as the "petroleum exclusion"' 3 or the non-liability
of the "gap owner."' 4 These laws also mimicked CERCLA's cumbersome
cleanup processes. In summarizing such laws, one commentator succinctly
captured their characteristics:
While there is some variation among the programs, state
Superfund or cleanup programs are generally characterized by
the following features: (1) procedures for emergency
response actions and permanent remediation of environmental
and human risk; (2) provisions for a cleanup fund or other
financing mechanisms to support program activities; (3)
enforcement authority to identify and compel responsible
parties to pay for site assessment and cleanup; (4) authorized
state agency with staff charged with responsibility for
oversight of remediation activities; and (5) provisions for
public participation in the remediation process. 5
In a similar form of parallelism, twenty-eight states enacted cleanup lien laws
akin to the federal lien in CERCLA, 6 giving those who pay for cleanup a lien
on the parcel. Several of those states went even further granting their state
law liens either "super coverage" by attaching to any and all of the
" See Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling Land: Encouraging the Redevelopment of
Contaminated Property, Nat. Resources & Env't 3, 5 (Spring 1996). Geltman provides a
very illuminating article that delineates the degree of "parallel" and "serial" developments
in the wake of CERCLA. All of the statistical material regarding state follow-on legislation
cited within this article is directly attributable to her efforts. Likewise, her analysis of how
state laws are evolving should be of great interest to anyone who is endeavoring to work in
this field.
12 See id. at 5.
'3 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
14 The gap owner falls between 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), current owner or operator, and §
9607(a)(2), owner at the time of disposal.
IS Geltman, supra note 11, at 5.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(l).
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defendant's property, or "super priority" by taking precedence over all prior
liens, including mortgages.
Where CERCLA pioneered, state serial regulation followed as well.
In addition to mini-CERCLAs and lien laws, approximately half of all the
states enacted business transfer laws. In this area there is more variation in
the state laws.
Property transfer provisions exist in the states as laws,
regulations, or policies that make the transfer of real property,
or ownership or control of such property, contingent on the
discovery, identification, investigation, cleanup or disclosure
of the existence of contamination .... Some simply require
disclosure of the environmental conditions of a site. Others
require a more advanced level of site investigation. A few
states require complete or near complete cleanup before a
transfer can occur.17
Also, states have gone beyond CERCLA into the underground storage tank
field, extending cleanup liability and financing laws to address that
ubiquitous problem. To put it tersely, the states picked up where Congress
had left off and ran with the ball, thereby compounding both the number of
laws affecting cleanups and greatly expanding their scope and requirements.
II. SUPERFUND (AND THE STATE LAWS) IN ACTION
Whatever the congressionall conception of the likely application of
Superfund may have been, the reality is that the law as written has a potential
reach that includes thousands, even hundreds of thousands of sites, the vast
majority of which are not severely contaminated and present only the
remotest of possibilities that their contamination will become widely
dispersed. The reason for this unexpected breadth lies in the statute's intake
mechanisms which can be triggered by a "release, or threatened release...
'7 Geltman, supra note 11, at 5-6. Superfund, as amended by the Superfund Amendment
and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), created incentives that encouraged further identification
of contamination in the property transfer setting. SARA created a limited "innocent
purchaser" defense from liability that required due diligence in seeking to determine that a
parcel was free of contamination at the time of purchase. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
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of a hazardous substance"' 8 that either creates "an imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment''19 or "causes
the incurrence of response costs. ' 20 The statutory terms "release ' 2 and
"hazardous substance" 22 are defined very broadly. While the imminent
endangerment threshold may be high, virtually any money spent on cleanup
of a contaminated parcel can lead to incurring response costs. In this aspect
of CERCLA's application, there is no controlling governmental hand to
impose defacto limits on invocation of the law. Statutory liability expressly
extends beyond governmental enforcement23 allowing recovery for "any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person [other than EPA, a
state, or an Indian Tribe] consistent with the national contingency plan. 24
Forcing even more sites into the ambit of Superfund's influence is the
statute's deliberate effort to coerce reporting of contamination, even in
exceedingly small amounts. Congress itself set the tone by requiring the
reporting of releases of "reportable quantities" that were to be set by EPA,
but "unless and until superceded by regulations establishing a reportable
quantity . . . a quantity of one pound ... shall [for some substances] be
deemed that quantity, the release of which requires notification .... 25
Given the dejure breadth of the law, it should be unsurprising that
over twenty thousand sites eventually came within the purview of Superfund
and found their way onto a list, called the National Priorities List ("NPL").
Needless to say, Congress recognized in advance that all identified sites
would not pose equivalent hazards, nor would all sites equally demand
federal attention and remediation. As the name of the NPL implies, the list
was to set priorities, based on a Hazard Ranking System ("HRS") that EPA
would promulgate. Federal action would be devoted to the most egregious
sites first, and later to the sites further down the list that posed significant
risks. Rather quickly, once the size of the list became apparent, it also
became patent that, at many of the sites EPA, would not be involved after the
initial HRS process demonstrated the relative lack of risk involved.
18 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
19 Id.
20 Id. § 9607(a).
21 See id. § 9601(22).
22 See id. § 9601(14).
23 See id. § 9607(a)(4).
24 Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
25 Id. § 9602(b).
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Importantly, however, a low HRS score did not vitiate the possibility of
private cleanup and cost recovery under section 107.
Potential section 107 liability had a further significant
consequence-an array of individuals and entities might be held liable for the
costs incurred. This result was as expected, for Congress in CERCLA had
embraced a very broad conception of the polluter pay principle of cost
internalization and forged it into the breadth of the CERCLA liability
section's coverage: it was broad indeed. CERCLA section 107 created a
group of liable parties called (perhaps euphemistically) "potentially
responsible parties" ("PRPs"). The PRP definitions netted owners and
operators, both current and at the time of release, possibly including secured
lenders who got involved in the site-related affairs of their borrowers; it also
netted generators and transporters of the hazardous materials that were
released into the environment. It was given retroactive effect, applying to
pre-1980 acts that were not liability-inducing at the time committed.26
Because of the 1986 Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act's
("SARA")27 reiteration of CERCLA's intent to create a broad liability
scheme, a popular saying evolved that SARA had been misnamed and that
her name was really RACHEL, the Reauthorization Act Confirms How
Everyone's Liable.
Not only was the statute's jurisdiction broader than expected and its
liability scheme vast, the cleanups obtained were neither quick or efficacious
by most people's standards. Cleanups were drawn out, averaging as much as
a decade each. In the view of many, the cleanups were not efficacious
because overly conservative standards forced parcels to be remediated to a
degree that would almost literally allow children to safely eat the post-
cleanup dirt. This standard raised the cost to seemingly astounding levels,
where totals for a site frequently exceeded $10 million.
The real world consequences of Superfund were enormous. PRPs felt
themselves victimized and unfairly ensnared in a tar baby-like process that
robbed them of resources without corresponding benefits to the environment.
Beyond their chagrin at being found liable for acts that were in some cases
innocent at the time of being done, PRPs at the larger sites almost inevitably
26 See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985), and
United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985), for pre-SARA cases that
discuss the retroactive application of CERCLA.
27 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986).
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became enmeshed in a high stakes legal miasma whose transaction costs too
often dwarfed the amounts required for cleanups. Again, upon a moment's
reflection, there should be no surprise in this. To begin with, the amounts
involved were sufficiently large to encourage litigation in hopes of avoiding
liability or shifting the lion's share of the liability to some other PRP.
Second, section 113, which expressly allowed for contribution actions in
favor of PRPs who had paid more than their share, encouraged such efforts
and simultaneously made them a sink for enormous transaction costs by
announcing virtually no standards for cost allocation among the responsible
group. Adding to the expense was the endless litigation regarding insurance
coverage between PRPs and their insurance carriers who had issued
Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policies that contained a litigable
and ambiguous (in its application to Superfund cases) "pollution exclusion"
clause.
One upshot of all this Superfund-induced legal travail was that any
parcels falling within Superfund's potential reach became pariah parcels for
would-be developers and lenders. Even if there was little likelihood of EPA
action, there was always the threat of private section 107 or 113 action by a
person who incurred response costs. With the web of liability including
lenders, and in the wake of a few highly acclaimed cases of lender liability,28
the risk averse lending community reacted by making parcels having
potential CERCLA claims off-limits for lending.
The experience under state mini-Superfund laws was, given their
parallelism to CERCLA, roughly the same. The main differences lay in the
fact that Superfund, as a matter of legislative intent, administrative execution,
and private usage targeted parcels that were more seriously contaminated.
The state laws, in contrast, deliberately included sites of wholly local
concern, exhibiting low levels of contamination. Moreover, the state lien
laws as serial additions to Superfund created additional disincentives to
parcel redevelopment. Beyond the mere presence of the liens as a
disincentive to investment, getting involved with a contaminated parcel put
other assets at risk in states having "super" lien coverage laws and any
28 The leading case in this line is United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1 1th
Cir. 1990). Ironically, perhaps, the lender in Fleet Factors was not at the margin of liability
and dragged in unfairly. Rather, the lender in Fleet Factors went into the property and
removed the fixtures and in doing so authored a release of hazardous substances. See id. at
1560.
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security value the parcel might have was thwarted by the "super" lien priority
laws.
III. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO LESSEN SUPERFUND'S IMPACT ON BROWNFIELDS
REDEVELOPMENT
The creation of a class of pariah parcels at which lenders and
developers are deterred from investing, raises a national concern that
Superfund, despite whatever good it may do at major sites of contamination,2 9
places a host of less contaminated sites in jeopardy of remaining either
unused or underused, and in continuing need of remediation. This category
of sites is commonly referred to as "Brownfields," a term that is in part
defined as half of a paired set of terms, "Greenfields" and "Brownfields."
The two contrasting terms represent a choice of sites for development,
usually commercial or industrial, in a metropolitan region.3" Greenfield sites
are usually located on the periphery of the built-up area. Their defining
characteristic is that they are previously unused land, in the sense that they
have not been home to non-agricultural commerce or industry. Brownfield
sites are ones that are located closer in, often within the urban core and older
suburbs. They are sites that have been utilized for commerce and industry in
the past and are now vacant. In imagining the scenarios at typical Brownfield
sites, firms that were operating them ceased being profitable, either through
market shifts, recessionary impacts, or poor management decisionmaking.
Whatever the cause, the parcel of land and its stock of fixtures and any
remaining machinery, came to be viewed as incapable of continued profitable
operation at the time. With deterioration of the buildings and fixtures that
attends the passage of time, only the land itself (due to its size and location)
is likely to retain significant value. Even valuable inactive sites do not
regenerate themselves. Additional investment is needed, and Brownfield
sites compete for that investment with other investment opportunities that
include Greenfield sites and potentially profitable investments unrelated to
29 Although it is beyond the scope of this commentary to do so, the author believes that
a strong case can be made defending Superfund from its many critics when it comes to
obtaining high quality cleanups at sites posing serious problems of hazardous contamination.
30 There are, to be sure, some rural brownfields sites, former homes to industries that, for
one reason or another, were located outside of urbanized areas. Many of the points made
herein apply equally to them, but the focus of this commentary is on sites in or near urban
areas.
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industrial development. (As someone once said, money is portable.)
The words "Brownfields" and "redevelopment" are inextricably
intertwined. This is where Superfimd comes in, not because of its effects on
those responsible for past events at the site, but because of its influence on
the incentive structure that faces those who would seek to redevelop a
Brownfield site by investing new funds. Many Brownfields have Superfund-
like histories. The sites are currently inactive, having been used industrially
and/or commercially in some past era, often an era in which handling
practices of materials were poor and waste disposal practices were worse.
That some contamination can be found at these parcels is almost inevitable.
Where found, the contamination raises direct possibilities of being caught up
in the Superfund web as a current owner or a lender who gets too involved
in the parcel's operation. Even where there is no known contamination, the
threat of its discovery has a similar effect.
Most Brownfields are at or beyond the outer limits of Superfund's
intended concern; the contamination at the vast majority of these sites is
unlikely to be severe. First, some number of the now inactive sites were not
home to industrial practices that utilized the most dangerous of contaminants
or those that are most difficult to cleanup after a release. Second, even if the
overall waste disposal practices of a firm were "bad," not all such firms
resorted to large scale on-site dumping of their own wastes. Superfund
annals are replete with sites that contain waste trucked in from industrial
firms located in nearby cities who opted against on-site disposal. As a third
check on the severity of contamination at Brownfield sites, it seems likely
that most inner-city firms simply could not afford the "luxury" of on-site
disposal of wastes, particularly large volume wastes or liquid wastes. In
urban areas, land prices served as a check on parcel size so as to prevent
maintenance of slag heaps and lagoons by most firms. Nuisance law also
may have played a role. Inner-city firms had (and have) more neighbors and
on-site disposal raises the possibility of complaints and litigation.3' Going
a step further, it seems reasonable to surmise that even the most benighted of
operators would be unlikely to have work performed in a defacto cesspool
of hazardous wastes. Finally, Superfund has now been around over fifteen
3' This point is speculative. My research has found only a small number of reported cases
of successful nuisance actions against inner-city firms whose on-site disposal practices were
held to constitute a nuisance. Nevertheless, accommodation of neighbors is plausible, and
the threat of litigation is real.
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years and there is little reason to expect that more than a few sites of major
contamination remain to be discovered. Thus, looking from the perspective
of the present, for sites not already high up the NPL, the scenario of urban
parcel contamination most often is going to be one of spills and leaks, small
scale disposal of solvents, leaching from materials piles, process dust and
shavings, and, perhaps, small scale debris piles, that result in very modest
levels of contamination. These modes of contamination create problems that
require cleanup, but they are frequently different in kind from the abandoned
quarry that became a liquid waste dump, or the landfill that mixed millions
of cubic yards of trash with discarded PCB-laden transformers and off-
specification chemical wastes. The typical Brownfield site presents local
problems that ought to be the subject of local solutions, emphatically not the
stuff warranting the "federal first" federalism of CERCLA's original
conception.
EPA has long since disavowed any continuing interest in imposing
vast federal liability or the difficulties of meeting extraordinary federal
cleanup standards on the PRPs at typical Brownfields parcels and has done
everything that it can to counter the "unintended effects" of Superfund, and
the pall it casts on redevelopment. This effort is manifested in at least six
different programmatic efforts already well underway and in support for
legislative modification of CERCLA to encourage Brownfields
redevelopment. Three of the EPA initiatives speak directly to developers and
lenders. These are the revised lender liability rule,32 prospective purchaser
agreements ("PPAs"),33 and the issuance of "comfort letters."34 The fourth,
speaks to the community generally, removing more than twenty thousand
sites from the lower reaches of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS") thereby
disclaiming federal interest in them.35 The fifth speaks to the states through
the Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") program under which EPA turns
32 See CERCLA Enforcement Against Lenders and Government Entities That Acquire
Property Involuntarily, 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517 (1995).
" See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements with Prospective
Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed.
Reg. 34,792 (1995).
14 A model comfort letter is on file with the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy
Review.
" See Amendment to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
Plan (NCP); CERCLIS Definition Change, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,053 (1995).
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over primary authority to the states whose agencies adopt voluntary cleanup
programs that meet certain guidelines.3 6 Finally, the sixth is the funding of
hundreds of small demonstration projects from which successful models for
Brownfields redevelopment can be drawn. These last two EPA initiatives
are, from a federalism perspective, very familiar. They look like traditional
cooperative federalism, programmatic delegation to state programs run in
conformity with federal standards, coupled with funding for research and
development of techniques (instead of technology) that can be employed in
the environmental improvement effort. The federal role at these less severely
contaminated sites is quite different than where Superfund started. EPA is
now gleaning and sharing technical and procedural expertise 37 and seed
money, it is no longer the sole controlling actor.
As a behavioral matter, the time has come to exonerate Superfund,
despite the impact that it had, as the obstacle that impedes present
brownfields redevelopment. Rational developers and lenders no longer have
anything to fear from Superfund. EPA demonstrated in unmistakably clear
terms and actions its intent not to become involved at parcels exhibiting
minimal risk, that is, at the precise sorts of brownfields sites that ought to be
the heart of redevelopment efforts. Moreover, even a developer or lender's
fear of being the target of private actions under either section 107 or 113 cost
recovery actions at a mildly contaminated site is chimerical. For private
parties to successfully invoke either section 107 or 113, they have to
undertake a cleanup and incur response costs that they can affirmatively
prove are "consistent with the National Contingency Plan. '38 For a site of
minimal contamination, it is ludicrous to anticipate that a private party will
go in and enmesh themselves in the rigamarole of an NCP-consistent
cleanup, where at best they end up with a drawn out, expensive cleanup, and
an expensive-to-pursue cause of action under CERCLA for cost recovery. It
36 40 C.F.R. § 300.505 (1996).
37 Superfund actions taken by EPA revealed the importance to the successful resolution
of problems at a site of community involvement and acceptance. Superfund Brownfields
demonstration projects, because they too involve multi-polar interests and profoundly affect
the community in which the site is located, have tended to include special concern for
community involvement in project design and effectuation. EPA has emphasized this facet
of the demonstration projects, and the knowledge gained in them is part of the transferrable
expertise that EPA is trying to develop.
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (stating that the government only needs to show that its
response costs are "not inconsistent with" the NCP).
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would be far easier for such parties to simply sue under a strict liability
common law tort theory to obtain damages for the losses (if any) suffered as
a result of the contamination. As an objective matter, Superfund has become
irrelevant at the typical Brownfield site.39
While Superfund itself has become objectively irrelevant, it remains
arguable that the shadow it once cast over all contaminated parcels continues
to influence behavior. What seems far more plausible, is that the present
deterrent to redevelopment is not Superfund, but the parallel state law mini-
Superfund enactments and property transfer laws that have yet to be scaled
back in their application to small-risk sites. Without belaboring the point
here, these state laws need to be changed to allow relief from the
cumbersome, expensive, and uncertain process that has grown up in so many
states. Without that change in state law, Brownfields redevelopment will
continue to be stymied in most locations.4"
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT
Assuming arguendo, that neither Superfund nor parallel and serial
state laws did anything to inhibit Brownfields redevelopment. To what
extent would that redevelopment spontaneously occur? There is good reason
to believe that the answer would be, "Sporadically, at best."
Historically, of course, Brownfield sites existed well in advance of
CERCLA and its state law imitators. In the pre-1980 period, free of the
influence of cleanup legislation, numerous urban manufacturing and
commercial facilities had closed down only to see the parcels languish and
the structures that were present deteriorate. While some were redeveloped,
many were not, and the pre-1980 period was quite plainly an era of immense
growth, especially in Greenfields areas. This era may be regarded as the
principal birthplace of urban sprawl, fueled by factors such as "white flight,"
" Lenders in particular continue to cite Superfund as a grounds for non-lending at typical
Brownfields parcels. At a minimum, their belief that Superfund will snare them at such sites
leaves their acumen open to question, or, less charitably, conjures up assertions that the
lenders are engaging in deliberate "brownlining." Brownlining occurs when lenders either
scrutinize or deny requests for funds that may be used for properties with an environmental
risk. See E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A.K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phenomenon. An
Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L.
Inst.) 10,337 (July 1995).
40 See Geltman, supra note 11, at 10.
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transportation improvements (the interstate highway system and the
construction of massive expressways), and relatively low-cost per acre, easy
to assemble and develop parcels.
There do not appear to be a large number of empirical studies that
identify with certainty the factors that most influence the manifest preference
for Greenfields sites, both in the pre-CERCLA and post-CERCLA world.
Nevertheless, both common sense and a limited sample of empirical data
suggest that economics played and continues to play a dominant role. It is
not difficult to imagine the cost comparison between Brownfields and
Greenfields development. As a starting point, consider the simple qualitative
estimates of cost and difficulty4 in the chart that follows:
TABLE 1: ROUGH COST COMPARISON OF BROWNFIELDS AND GREENFIELDS
DEVELOPMENT
Item Brownfields Greenfields
Land cost per acre Higher Lower
Demolition & removal of debris Frequently expensive None
Taxes Higher Lower
Insurance Higher Lower
Zoning approvals More difficult to Easier to obtain
obtain
Objections by neighbors More frequent Few neighbors
Infrastructure costs Lower Higher
Transportation costs Perhaps lower Perhaps higher
The rough qualitative comparison leaves little doubt that there is
likely to be a Greenfields economic preference among developers. Moreover,
the comparison probably understates the non-CERCLA case in favor of
Greenfields development. Still other economic factors make Greenfields the
preferable choice. The first of these is subsidies. In general, exurban
" Difficulty, in most cases, is directly linked to transaction costs that will be incurred in
the effort to overcome the problem. Thus greater difficulties will result in higher costs.
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communities are able to do more in terms of tax abatements and other
incentives (subsidies) to attract new development than are urban areas that
face serious tax equity issues in granting excessive subsidies to would-be
redevelopments.4 2 The second of these, although counter-intuitive at first
glance, is labor costs. A provocative recent study reports: "The largest
[private] benefit of suburban development is the low labor cost of the outer
suburbs. The difference between wages in the central city and the outer
suburbs is particularly large for skilled female workers."43
While precisely quantifying the extent by which the private benefits
of Greenfields development exceed those of Brownfields redevelopment" is
beyond the scope of this inquiry, understanding the magnitude of the
economic incentives facing project proponents is vitally important in
deciding the law's role in influencing behavior. The greater the magnitude
of the greenfields economic benefit, the less likely it becomes that the legal
rules regarding parcel remediation, either current or changed, are capable of
significantly influencing development behavior.45
At an empirical level, it is patent that Greenfields historically enjoyed
an economic advantage over Brownfields. So-called urban sprawl and the
non-reuse of many Brownfield sites was afait accompli long before 1980
when Superfund was enacted. The preceding chart suggests the reasons in
support of sprawl, with the most likely culprit of the imbalance being land
and demolition costs. It is virtually axiomatic that these costs will be higher
for Brownfield sites than for Greenfield sites. As a historic matter, urban
land prices on a per acre basis are higher than prices for farmland at the edge
of the urban area. Even more obviously, the costs of demolition and disposal
of a former factory site are dramatically higher than the costs of removing a
farmhouse and barn or two. Still, when the costs are treated as capital costs
42 This assertion by the author suggests an area for further research.
41 JOSEPH PERSKY & WIM WIEWEL, CENTRAL CITY AND SUBURBAN DEVELOPMENT: WHO
PAYS AND WHO BENEFITS? 2 (1995). The estimate the cost savings per employee of
greenfields over brownfields to be $2,300 to $2,900 per year. Id. at 10.
' Without making the case for it here, an implicit premise of this commentary is that there
are significant public benefits that inure from Brownfields redevelopment. A a sample,
these benefits accrue in terms of reduced unemployment in the inner city, broader tax base
in the inner cities, reduced congestion, commuting and associated air pollution and accident
costs, and the preservation of greenspace.
" Necessarily, an implicit assumption of the critics of Superfund is that the comparative
economics of developing Greenfields and Brownfields are not too one-sided in favor of
Greenfields. Otherwise, Superfund would have no significant role in shaping behavior.
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and amortized over a long period, even a several thousand dollar per acre cost
advantage of greenfields sites might not be prohibitive.
Anecdotal data4 6 suggest that the amount of the cost differential for
large projects is beyond the "several thousand dollar per acre" range. In
particular, three separate studies found the greenfields economic advantage
for larger projects sufficiently great as to dwarf other issues. The first of
these studies was conducted in 1971-in a pre-CERCLA world. That study,
titled the "Paired Newtown Project," called for developers to study the
feasibility of placing the same development at two sites, one in-town and one
out-of-town. The study found the land acquisition cost for the in-town sites
to be $130,000 per acre and the out-of-town sites to be only $2,000 per acre.47
Detroit, Michigan has offered two recent case studies, one that is essentially
pre-CERCLA and one that came a decade later. In 1980, General Motors
Corporation, with extensive assistance from the City of Detroit, procured and
built on a 465-acre urban site called "Poletown." Armed with its power of
condemnation, the use of which spawned litigation questioning whether the
condemnation was in aid of a public purpose, Detroit spent $135 million for
acquisition, demolition and site preparation.4 8 This sum translates to a per
acre cost of $290,000."9 Finally, in building a single-family home
neighborhood on 25.8 acres of mostly vacant land that was already owned by
the City of Detroit, the city ended up spending $19,400,000, or $776,000 per
acre, for the land, the demolition, and the preparation of the site for
46 No claim is being made here that the three studies recounted here constitute all of the
data that might be found by a thorough inquiry. My familiarity with these studies is
attributable to the work of a Wayne State Law School student, whose forthcoming note I
reviewed. See Joseph B. Urban, Life After Michigan Public Act 307: A Look Beyond
Environmental Liability as a Limit to Urban Redevelopment, 43 WAYNE L. REV.
(forthcoming 1997) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review). I have not found contradictory data, but I have not made a search for additional
material of this sort. Nevertheless, the consistency of these three studies in finding costs that
favor Greenfields by two orders of magnitude compels attention to the fact that the
economics of Brownfields redevelopment are potentially more significant than the laws
regarding cleanups and liability for remediation costs.
17 See THE METROPOLITAN FUND, REGIONAL NEW-TOWN DESIGN (1971).
48 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 469 (Mich. 1981)
(Ryan, J., dissenting).
" Some of the parcels that went into making the Poletown site were not abandoned;
indeed they were part of a stable residential community, but large portions of the tract were
vacant prior to the project.
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construction.5 °
The decided cost disadvantage of Brownfields evidenced by the three
examples is both startling and a cause for concern. If the data reflect a
pattern comprising more than three isolated examples, then it is very
important to find ways in which Brownfields land and demolition costs can
be reduced unless Brownfields redevelopment is to be relegated to being an
occasional, highly subsidized event. For present purposes, assume that there
is some broader phenomenon at work, that the cost of Brownfields
redevelopment for projects of those types is substantially higher than a
comparable Greenfields site. On that assumption, insights into why the costs
are so much higher may assist in identifying strategies that will reduce the
cost differential. At that point, cleanup laws come back into focus as a
further stumbling block for brownfields redevelopment.
A. Land Cost Issues
Just as anecdotal data (most of it from the Detroit, Michigan area)
raised grave doubts about the feasibility of Brownfields redevelopment on the
economic front, different anecdotal data from the same region offers some
reason for optimism. First, the reasons for the high relative cost of
Brownfields parcels can be explained (and in a way that can be addressed in
the longer term). Second, changes in cleanup laws do seem to kindle
Brownfields redevelopment.
A factor common to the three separate studies of redevelopment cost
was that all involved relatively large parcels and some constraints relating to
the amount of time in which the land could be assembled and prepared for
reuse. Amassing larger parcels in urban areas where the land ownership has
become fractured greatly increases transaction costs, both in terms of the
numbers of parties with whom negotiations must be conducted and in the
impetus to strategic holdout behavior.5' One way in which to limit these
problems is to focus on smaller projects, that involve only the purchase of
two or three contiguous parcels, as the bulwarks of Brownfields
' See Urban, supra note 47, at 9-10 (citing David Barkholz, Developers Plan Subdivision
on Detroit's East Side, available in 1990 WL 2674041, and Susan Watson, Homerama
Helps Bring City to its Feet, DET. FREE PRESS, June 5, 1992, at 3A).
"I In the Greenfields setting, the opposite is true, most land is held in large tracts and there
is potential competition among sellers who seek to capitalize by selling their land (that is
becoming less well-suited to farming due to nuisance concerns, etc.) at a great profit.
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redevelopment.52
When larger tracts are required, the municipality or state can add the
power of condemnation to the mix.53 It would seem that strategic holdouts
can be avoided and parcels can be amassed, paying no more than fair market
value. Fair market value of brownfields property, it would seem, ought to be
relatively low. First, the present disuse or underuse of the target parcels
implies a low market value. Second, the fear of contamination, or presence
of mild contamination that inhibits would-be-developers, is a further drag on
market value.
Unfortunately for Brownfields redevelopment, prices paid in
condemnation are unlikely to reflect these price-depressing factors.
Consider, for example, Detroit's current effort to amass land for a downtown
dual stadium project.54 Most simply, condemnation (or the threat of
condemnation) is not succeeding in limiting the land acquisition cost to
anything closely resembling the actual fair market value (and significantly
depressed value) of the properties involved. At a strategic level, the City of
Detroit is under considerable time pressure to put the deal together and make
it happen. The principals whose funds and cooperation undergird the project
want the project to go forward on a relatively fast track. The exigencies of
running a business in the real world demand no less. Strategically, the City
is best served by negotiating successfully for the purchase of the land
involved, condemnation proceedings take time and divert resources from
other activities. Sellers understand this and, therefore, seek inflated prices in
their negotiations. Once the City agrees to even a mildly inflated price for
one parcel, an upward spiral in market price begins. In theory, the City can
check the most unreasonable demands by use of condemnation. In
condemnation, however, the burden of proof is on the City to establish the
fair market value of the parcel. Their own recent "voluntary" purchases work
52 In terms of community acceptance, smaller undertakings have as an additional
advantage the fact that they are less likely to meet with resistance.
11 This is almost universally considered to be a proper use of the condemnation power.
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). Recall, however, that two of the three "expensive" land
acquisition examples were cases where the parcels were amassed using condemnation as an
adjunct to negotiations.
' The insights that follow are gleaned from conversations with my colleague, Professor
John Mogk of Wayne State University Law School. Prof. Mogk has been appointed by the
City of Detroit to lead its land acquisition efforts for the stadium project.
[Vol. 21:265
1997] SUPERFUND AND THE EVOLUTION OF BROWNFIELDS 283
at cross-purposes with their efforts to avoid inflationary payments.
More critically, should the City attempt to use the contamination
angle to reduce fair market value, it faces two distinct problems. If the City
knows that the contamination is a significant factor, its proof would have to
focus on the considerable expense involved in cleaning the parcel for
redevelopment-at the risk of scaring off the Brownfields redeveloper. More
pragmatically, that proof is not often readily available, it has to be developed
by on-site testing. It is very expensive to do the needed testing to pinpoint
the contamination and the remedial work needed to be done. Further, to do
that sort of work usually entails long lead times that are not available in the
context of the redeveloper's timetable or in the context of typical
condemnation proceedings. Additionally, obtaining the needed access to do
the testing, in the absence of total cooperation of the parcel owner, is
problematic both as to the right of the City to obtain the information and the
delay that will be encountered in confirming that the right to obtain the
information exists. Taken as a whole, it is evident that the City, even if it is
willing to expose the extent of the contamination, will seldom be in a position
to make a sufficient record on contamination to affect the condemnation
award.
There is no reason to think that Detroit's difficulty in limiting land
acquisition costs will not be replicated in most large-scale redevelopment
scenarios. Most development projects have a time sensitive component. The
capital needed for the project, having been amassed, or at least earmarked for
a project, has a time-value. Delay is, literally, costly. Cost aside, delay in
consolidating the needed land and/or proof of significant contamination
cleanup cost for a Brownfield site, in the paradigmatic context where the
developer is in a position to be choosing among sites, work in favor of
selection of one of the alternatives. Thus, like Detroit, other cities seeking
to spur Brownfields redevelopment cannot act at a pace that would allow
them the opportunity to defeat inflated claims of fair market value in their
land acquisition efforts.
Although overpayment for land consolidation is likely to be an
endemic Brownfields redevelopment problem, cities can attempt to limit their
expense by what might be called "land banking." Cities can amass the
contiguous parcels over time in advance of Brownfields redevelopment and
market the pre-consolidated parcels to redevelopers. Though providing some
relief from overpayment, this sort of banking imposes costs as well. Cities
incur obvious capital costs for the acquisitions and suffer somewhat more
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subtle revenue effects in terms of foregone taxes on the parcels during the
period in which they are no longer among the ratables.
Returning to the broader plane for a moment, it seems patent that
brownfields redevelopment will almost invariably be more costly, in terms
of tangible project costs, than greenfields development. The economists'
"rational maximizer" developer will, accordingly, opt for the latter unless
there are other incentives at work. There are other incentives, some
economic and some intangible. On the economic front, incentives can be
added, ranging from outright subsidies and to creative forms of tax abatement
such as enterprise zones that grant forbearance of a portion of the anticipated
future tax receipts from new, industrial commercial, or residential ventures.
Intangibles include matters of environmentalism, good public relations, civic
pride, or a desire to invest in areas of economic need. For present purposes,
however, the point to be made is that the economics of Brownfields
redevelopment is a significant, possibly overriding, factor that operates to
deter redevelopment projects.
B. State Law Issues
The parallel state mini-superfund laws and their serial extensions into
the areas of super liens and property transfer restrictions create real legal
disincentives to Brownfields redevelopments where Superfund's
impediments are chimerical. No certain measure of the effect of these state
laws is available, but using recent Michigan experience as a guide, it appears
that the effect is substantial.
Michigan was a state that promptly enacted parallel mini-superfund
legislation in the wake of CERCLA's passage.5 That legislation, titled the
"Michigan Environmental Response Act" ("MERA"), was very similar to
Superfund. It created strict, joint and several, retroactive liability for
environmental response and remediation costs. As with several other state
laws of this type, it closed gaps in Superfund, having no petroleum exclusion
and holding liable all in the chain of title from the time of release onward. 6
Cleanup standards under the old act were cumbersome and stringent,
although there were variable standards that allowed for three different levels
s MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § § 299.601-.618, repealed by P.A. No. 451, § 90,101 (West
1996) (effective Mar. 30, 1995).
56 See id.
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of cleanup depending on future land use and the public recording of ongoing
institutional controls. Redeveloping even mildly contaminated property
required extensive negotiation with the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources ("MDNR") and other stakeholders to win approval of remedial
action plans. It was a gauntlet that few developers chose to run.
In 1994, Michigan's Governor John Engler realigned the MDNR's
functions by executive order, shifting MERA functions to the environmental
wing of the agency, the newly created Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality ("MDEQ"). Concurrently, the governor, through his
appointment power installed new leadership at the agency, staffing the
policymaking posts with persons having a more pro-development orientation
than had prevailed in the past. Concurrently, the governor appointed a task
force chaired by a pro-development attorney, to suggest amendment and
codification of all the state's environmental laws. In 1995, that later initiative
bore fruit. Importantly for present purposes, the environmental law that was
most significantly altered in the process was MERA, which reemerged
substantially amended and bearing the nondescript name of Part 201.17
Part 201 bears a fundamental structural resemblance to MERA and
CERCLA; it remains a liability-for-cleanup law that provides express causes
of action to recover cleanup costs from an array of liable parties,58 but alnost
everything else underwent change. Liability now depends on the property
involved being a "facility," a term that is now defined in a way that requires
not only the release of a hazardous substance, but contamination at the site
must exceed a certain concentration to be within the statutory definition. 9
Strict liability is eliminated for owners insofar as proof is required that the
owner is responsible for causing the release-the mere fact of a release at the
facility does not render an owner liable.60 The law does, however, erect a
presumption of responsibility for contamination in the event that anyone who
becomes an owner after June 5, 1995, does not establish a level of pre-
existing contamination through a "Baseline Environmental Assessment"
5 See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.20101-.20142 (West 1996).
5 See generally. id. § 20,126a. See also Arbor Properties, Inc. v. Sun Oil Co., No. 1:94-
CV-377, 1994 WL 702707 (W. D. Mich. Feb. 13, 1995).
19 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20101(1). The concentration is that set as the standard
for a residential quality cleanup level by another part of the amended statute. See id. §
3 2 4.20120a.
6 See id. § 324.20126(1)(a)-(b).
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("BEA") process.6' Lender liability is also explicitly addressed by Part 201,
slightly broadening the definition of who is entitled to the protections
afforded lenders,62 and making clear that lenders are not liable when they act
to marshal assets, take title in the process of disposing of the property, and
advise debtors without participating in the management of the facility.63
In May of 1996, MDEQ attempted to gauge the effect of the Part 201
changes on Brownfields redevelopment activity. Acting through its
Environmental Response Division, MDEQ conducted a survey of thirty-two
Michigan municipalities to ascertain what impact the changes in Part 201
were having in Brownfields redevelopment. The reported results are very
intriguing.'
28 of 32 municipalities surveyed indicated that interest in
redeveloping Brownfields properties in their communities had
increased after the effective date of the Part 201 changes.
19 of 32 municipalities reported a total of $200 million in private
investment in the redevelopment of Brownfields properties, along
with the creation of 2,070 new jobs.
374 Baseline Environmental Assessments have been received by the
MDEQ during the one-year period beginning June 5, 1995, as
compared to only 37 Covenents Not To Sue being issued during a
four-year period preceding the Part 201 amendments to MERA.65
61 See id. § 324.20126(6). There is also an "innocent purchaser" defense for purchasers
who undertake "all appropriate inquiry" (e.g., due diligence) prior to purchase and fail to
discover contamination that is nonetheless present at that time. See id. § 324.20126(3)(h).
62 See id. § 324.20101(1)(s)(i)-(xii).
63 See id. § 324.20101a(1)-(2).
I See Environmental Response Division of the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality, The Part 201 Amendments: One Year Later, An Interim Evaluation of the
Effectiveness of the June 5, 1995 Amendments to Part 201 of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act, Act 451 of 1994, as amended (June 5, 1996) (on file with
William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review). At present the report is available
only in draft form.
65 A covenant not to sue under MERA was the administrative mechanism that allowed
would-be redevelopers of property to receive assurances that they would be able to limit
their MERA liability at the site to a negotiated fixed.
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191 sites will be removed from Michigan's inventory of Sites of
Environmental Contamination in 1996 because they no longer meet
the revised definition of a contaminated parcel or because all
necessary cleanup activities have been completed.
It is almost assuredly over-generous to Part 201 to attribute to it all
of the favorable reports of increased Brownfields activity. The overhaul of
MERA coincides in time with an improvement of the state's economy.
Concurrently, the changes in the state's administrative structure fostered
changes in administrative policies regarding encouragement of Brownfields
redevelopment at the state level. There were also some changes at local
levels of government that made cooperation with MDEQ more likely.66
Nevertheless, even if the observed signs of increased Brownfields activity are
partially attributable to other factors, the magnitude and timing of the
observed change suggests a strong correlation of the change in law with
revitalized interest in Brownfields.
Almost nothing, of course, in CERCLA or EPA policy binds the
states to alter their parallel and serial responses to CERCLA. The states
remain free to retain their laws that act as an obstacle to Brownfields
redevelopment or to alter those laws. The gain in Brownfields activity that
Michigan already has experienced, especially if it is replicated in other states
that relax their cleanup laws, ought to catalyze other states to consider
changes in their mini-superfunds and other redevelopment-inhibiting laws.
V. BROWNFIELDS FEDERALISM
Initially, a major focus of this commentary was to examine the role,
if any, that the EPA and CERCLA play in inhibiting Brownfields
redevelopment. The thesis has been that CERCLA is not a core problem, nor
even a significant problem. The far more significant stumbling blocks are (1)
the economics disadvantages of Brownfields in comparison to Greenfields
sites and (2) the impediment to redevelopment posed by state mini-Superfund
laws and their extensions. The brief examination of each of these areas
undertaken in this commentary did little to dispel concerns that Brownfields
6 Detroit, in particular, underwent a change in administration with the election of Dennis
Archer as Mayor. Mayor Archer has established a far better rapport with state officials than
that enjoyed by the more confrontational administration of former Mayor Coleman Young.
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redevelopment, especially when larger tracts are involved, is a viable
competitor when cost is a vital concern.
Having reached those tentative conclusions, however, is not
tantamount to saying that there remains no benefit to CERCLA amendment
and restructuring Brownfields federalism. Albeit a function of unnecessary
fear of liability on the part of lenders and developers, the present state of the
federal law is acting as a deterrent to the viability of widespread efforts at
nationwide Brownfields redevelopment. That misperception ought to be
affirmatively eliminated by legislation that disclaims federal interest in
minimally contaminated sites. That renunciation, however, should not, and
need not, come at the expense of a continuing core federal interest in ensuring
a level national playing field when it comes to setting public health and safety
standards for remedial cleanups wherever they may be needed.
In giving a fuller shape to proposals for CERCLA reform, it is
important simultaneously to isolate and prescribe affirmative actions that the
federal government should take under the aegis of CERCLA to protect health
while encouraging Brownfields redevelopment. The quest for such an
affirmative federal role best begins by revisiting the "traditional" federalism
that has pervaded so much of environmental law since Earth Day in 1970.
This "cooperative federalism" formula is well understood-uniform national
standards that ensure against the race of laxity in the protection of health and
the environment, and local implementation and application of the national
norms in a way that allows the state to be at the forefront in solving its own
environmental problems. This relationship not only preserves the states'
traditional primacy in police power protection of health and the environment,
it does so without sacrificing economies of scale in the technically
sophisticated scientific area of standard setting. An additional national
benefit accrues through federal review and limited oversight of state
programs. The federal government is in a position to serve as a clearinghouse
for the generation and dissemination of information on Brownfields
redevelopment experience. Additionally, the traditional cooperative
federalism models have long proven the value of using the deeper pocket and
greater cost spreading ability of the federal government to offer funding that
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assists with demonstration projects that frequently are crucial to innovation.67
Applying those general precepts to CERCLA reform in the
Brownfields context is a task that the legislative process is well suited to
perform. Even so, it may be helpful to provide a series of lists of the areas
and of specific steps that ought to be considered in crafting legislation.
To disavow federal interest in Brownfields sites as a remedial and/or liability
matter:
1. Establish by statute a jurisdictional lower limit to CERCLA liability
(§§ 106, 107, and 113) based on HRS scores in all states that
establish qualifying state cleanup programs.
2. Expressly delegate authority to EPA to promulgate its lender liability
rule, or issue the rule in statutory form.
3. Expressly authorize and encourage EPA to enter into prospective
purchaser agreements that include contribution protection with
Brownfields redevelopers having no past involvement at a site, thus
protecting them from federal liability for preexisting contamination
at these sites without regard to HRS score.
4. Expressly authorize and encourage EPA to enter into prospective
purchaser agreements that include contribution protection with all
Brownfields redevelopers protecting them from federal liability for
preexisting contamination at sites having sufficiently low HRS
scores.
To establish cooperative federalism as the norm in regard to cleanups:
1. Expressly require EPA to establish standards for state cleanup
programs by a certain date, that will trigger the jurisdictional
renunciation of CERCLA for low HRS scoring sites.
2. Expressly require EPA to include in standards for program
qualification, national safety standards for cleaned sites that are
sufficiently health protective but that allow for the states to take
subsequent land use and institutional controls into account in
assessing residual risk.
67 Moving CERCLA in this direction is, it would seem, in keeping with the times and
mood of Congress and the EPA. Relying on centralized standard setting and localized
implementation is a politically palatable formula that is well suited to achieving results in
the field.
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3. Expressly authorize states to adopt and apply more restrictive state
safety standards than the minimum needed to qualify for federal
program qualification.
To facilitate innovation and experimentation in redevelopment methods:
1. Expressly require EPA to create a clearinghouse for information
relating to site-specific Brownfields experience.
2. Expressly grant EPA authority and establish sufficient funding for
EPA to help facilitate a significant number of Brownfields
redevelopment demonstration projects.68
3. Expressly authorize EPA to recommend limited site-specific
legislation granting federal tax benefits to encourage Brownfields
redevelopment of the relevant site.
To investigate the remaining obstacles to Brownfields redevelopment:
1. Expressly grant EPA authority and establish sufficient funding to
study the obstacles to brownfields redevelopment, including, but not
limited to, the remaining impact of CERCLA itself, the comparative
economics of Brownfield and Greenfield site selection decisions, and
the impact of state laws on development behavior.69
VI. CONCLUSION
For me, this commentary has been an informative journey. I began
believing that CERCLA did cast a significant shadow on Brownfields
redevelopment. That was the standard fare in the journal literature, even
though there was some lack of specificity of exactly how and why the
deterrent to redevelopment was so great at sites where EPA was clearly never
going to get involved. I thought that by explicating the means by which
CERCLA generated the unintended consequence of hindering Brownfields
redevelopment, I would be able to suggest means for reducing the magnitude
68 This is essentially a call for Congress to lend its support to the demonstration projects
program that EPA has established.
69 Scope of the study could include consideration of the desirability of federal preemption
of various state laws that inhibit Brownfields redevelopment (e.g., state mini-Superfund
laws, state super-lien laws, and state property transfer laws). As noted previously, without
elaborate consideration of the ramifications of that preemption I think it is an unwise step.
That is not, however, a reason to preclude a thoughtful study of the possibility.
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of the problem. As a secondary issue, the fact that CERCLA was having
unintended consequences on state and local Brownfields initiatives would
insert a federalism concern, recently made more pointed by United States v.
Olin Corp.7 ° In that decision, Judge Hand of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama asserted that cleanups of contaminated
parcels were essentially local problems having no discernible interstate
content or context and, accordingly, were beyond the power of Congress to
control. Given my steadfast belief that CERCLA, warts and all, is an
essential element of national regulatory policy having immense economic
consequences, addressing that issue appeared to be useful, but not particularly
difficult.
What emerged was a quite different reality. Through imaginative
administrative actions, EPA had so significantly reduced the scope of
Superfund's impact on redevelopment of minimally contaminated sites, that
the failure of most Brownfields redevelopment efforts demanded another
explanation. It was forthcoming in the form of a comparative benefit cost
analysis that found Greenfields to hold a far greater than expected economic
advantage, and the fact that state laws had entered the field in almost
precisely the way that CERCLA was conventionally thought to operate-as
a huge source of potential legal liability and travail for Brownfields
developers and their lenders. Together this part of the exercise leads to two
conclusions, to wit: (1) that Superfund is not a major problem, but state law
is; and (2) whatever the strategy for reducing the legal inhibitions may be, it
cannot be considered alone without addressing the considerable economic
incentives disfavoring Brownfields in competition with Greenfields.
Having said that, in turning to the prescription for action, the
federalism concerns offer a beacon. CERCLA, rightly or wrongly, was not
modeled on the cooperative federalism that had been employed in the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act. As time and experience provided a better
guide of the nature of hazardous contamination and its remediation, the
problem began to more closely resemble more conventional pollution. The
stakeholders were, in the main, local, even if the generic problem had
national public policy and economic overtones. The role well played by the
federal government in such cases is not that of micro-manager, but that of
policymaker and facilitator. EPA can set standards, generate ideas, collect
information, fund demonstration projects, and more, but in the end, the states
70 United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
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are most in touch with the people and firms who have to make Brownfields
redevelopment a reality in their locale. The dejure responsibilities ought to
be adjusted to reflect those capabilities.
